Scalable and Differentially Private Distributed Aggregation in the
  Shuffled Model by Ghazi, Badih et al.
Scalable and Differentially Private Distributed
Aggregation in the Shuffled Model
Badih Ghazi
Google Research
badihghazi@gmail.com
Rasmus Pagh
Google Research
& IT University of Copenhagen
pagh@itu.dk
Ameya Velingker
Google Research
ameyav@google.com
Abstract
Federated learning promises to make machine learning feasible on distributed, pri-
vate datasets by implementing gradient descent using secure aggregation methods.
The idea is to compute a global weight update without revealing the contributions
of individual users.
Current practical protocols for secure aggregation work in an “honest but curious”
setting where a curious adversary observing all communication to and from the
server cannot learn any private information assuming the server is honest and
follows the protocol.
A more scalable and robust primitive for privacy-preserving protocols is shuffling
of user data, so as to hide the origin of each data item. Highly scalable and secure
protocols for shuffling, so-called mixnets, have been proposed as a primitive for
privacy-preserving analytics in the Encode-Shuffle-Analyze framework by Bittau
et al. Recent papers by Cheu et al. and Balle et al. have formalized the “shuffled
model” and suggested protocols for secure aggregation that achieve differential
privacy guarantees. Their protocols come at a cost, though: Either the expected
aggregation error or the amount of communication per user scales as a polynomial
nΩ(1) in the number of users n.
In this paper we propose simple and more efficient protocol for aggregation in the
shuffled model, where communication as well as error increases only polylogarith-
mically in n. Our new technique is a conceptual “invisibility cloak” that makes
users’ data almost indistinguishable from random noise while introducing zero
distortion on the sum.
1 Introduction
We consider the problem of privately summing n numbers in the shuffled model recently defined
by Cheu et al. [5]. For consistency with the literature we will use the term aggregation for the
sum operation. Consider n users with data x1, . . . , xn ∈ [0, 1]. In the shuffled model user i
applies a randomized encoder algorithm E that maps xi to a multiset of m messages, E(xi) =
{yi,1, . . . , yi,m} ⊆ Y , where m is a parameter. Then a trusted shuffler S takes all nm messages
and outputs them in random order. Finally, an analyzer algorithm A maps the shuffled output
S(E(x1), . . . , E(xn)) to an estimate of
∑
i xi.
A protocol in the shuffled model is (ε, δ)-differentially private if S(R1(x1), . . . , Rn(xn)) is (ε, δ)-
differentially private (see definition in Section 2.1), where probabilities are with respect to the random
choices made in the algorithm E and the shuffler S . The privacy claim is justified by the existence of
highly scalable protocols for privately implementing the shuffling primitive [3, 5].
Preprint. Under review.
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Two protocols for aggregation in the shuffled model were recently suggested by Balle et al. [2] and
Cheu et al. [5]. We discuss these further in Section 1.2, but note here that all previously known
protocols have either communication or error that grows as nΩ(1). This is unavoidable for single-
message protocols, by the lower bound in [2], but it has been unclear if such a trade-off is necessary
in general. Cheu et al. [5] explicitly mention it as an open problem to investigate this question.
1.1 Our Results
We show that a trade-off is not necessary — it is possible to avoid the nΩ(1) factor in both the error
bound and the amount of communication per user. The precise results obtained depend on the notion
of “neighboring dataset” in the definition of differential privacy. We consider the standard notion of
neighboring dataset in differential privacy, that the input of a single user is changed, and show:
Theorem 1. Let ε > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1) be any real numbers. There exists a protocol in the shuffled
model that is (ε, δ)-differentially private under single-user changes, has expected error O( 1ε
√
log 1δ ),
and where each encoder sends O(log( nεδ )) messages of O(log(
n
δ )) bits.
We also consider a different notion similar to the gold standard of secure multi-party computation:
Two datasets are considered neighboring if the their sums (taken after discretization) are identical.
This notion turns out to allow much better privacy, even with zero noise in the final sum — the only
error in the protocol comes from representing the terms of the sum in bounded precision.
Theorem 2. Let ε > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1) be any real numbers and let m > 10 log ( nεδ ). There exists a
protocol in the shuffled model that is (ε, δ)-differentially private under sum-preserving changes, has
worst-case error 2−m, and where each encoder sends m messages of O(m) bits.
In addition to analyzing error and privacy of our new protocol we consider its resilience towards
untrusted users that may deviate from the protocol. While the shuffled model is vulnerable to such
attacks in general [2], we argue in Section 2.5 that the privacy guarantees of our protocol are robust
even to a large fraction of colluding users. For reasons of exposition we show Theorem 2 before
Theorem 1. The technical ideas behind our new results are discussed in Section 1.3. Next, we discuss
implications for machine learning and the relation to previous work.
1.2 Discussion of Related Work and Applications
Our protocol is applicable in any setting where secure aggregation is applied. Below we mention
some of the most significant examples and compare to existing results in the literature.
Federated Learning. Our main application in a machine learning context is gradient descent-based
federated learning [9]. The idea is to avoid collecting user data, and instead compute weight updates
in a distributed manner by sending model parameters to users, locally running stochastic gradient
descent on private data, and aggregating model updates over all users. Using a secure aggregation
protocol (see e.g. [4]) guards against information leakage from the update of a single user, since
the server only learns the aggregated model update. A federated learning system based on these
principles is currently used by Google to train neural networks on data residing on users’ phones [10].
Current practical secure aggregation protocols such as that of Bonawitz et al. [4] have user computa-
tion cost O(n2) and total communication complexity O(n2), where n is the number of users. This
limits the number of users that can participate in the secure aggregation protocol. In addition, the
privacy analysis assumes of an “honest but curious” server that does not deviate from the protocol,
so some level of trust in the secure aggregation server is required. In contrast, protocols based on
shuffling work with much weaker assumptions on the server [3, 5]. In addition to this advantage, total
work and communication of our new protocol scales near-linearly with the number of users.
Differentially Private Aggregation in the Shuffled Model. It is known that gradient descent can
work well even if data is accessible only in noised form, in order to achieve differential privacy [1].
Note that in order to run gradient descent in a differentially private manner, privacy parameters need
to be chosen in such a way that the combined privacy loss over many iterations is limited.
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Cheu et al. [5]
ε
√
n
m
1
1
ε log
n
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1
δ
Single-user change
Balle et al. [2] 1 log n n
1/6 log1/3(1/δ)
ε2/3
Single-user change
New
log( nεδ )
m > log( nεδ )
log(nδ )
m
1
ε
√
log 1δ
2−m
Single-user change
Sum-preserving change
Figure 1: Comparison of differentially private aggregation protocols in the shuffled model with
(ε, δ)-differential privacy. The number of users is n, andm is an integer parameter. Message sizes are
in bits; asymptotic notation is suppressed for readability. We consider two types of privacy protection,
corresponding to different notions of “neighboring dataset” in differential privacy: In the first one,
which was considered in previous papers, datasets are considered neighboring if they differ in the
data of a single user. In the latter, datasets are considered neighboring if they have the same sum.
Each aggregation protocol shown in Figure 1 represents a different trade-off, optimizing different
parameters. Our protocols are the only ones that avoid nΩ(1) factors in both the communication per
user and the error.
Private Sketching and Statistical Learning. At first glance it may seem that aggregation is a
rather weak primitive for combining data from many sources in order to analyze it. However, research
in the area of data stream algorithms has uncovered many non-trivial algorithms that are small linear
sketches, see e.g. [6, 11]. Linear sketches over the integers (or over a finite field) can be implemented
using secure aggregation by computing linear sketches locally and summing them up over some
range that is large enough to hold the sum. This unlocks many differentially private protocols in the
shuffled model, e.g. estimation of `p-norms, quantiles, heavy hitters, and number of distinct elements.
Second, as observed in [5] we can translate any statistical query over a distributed data set to an
aggregation problem over numbers in [0, 1]. That is, every learning problem solvable using a small
number of statistical queries [8] can be solved privately and efficiently in the shuffled model.
1.3 Invisibility Cloak Protocol
We use a technique from protocols for secure multi-party aggregation (see e.g. [7]): Ensure that
individual numbers passed to the analyzer are fully random by adding random noise terms, but
coordinate the noise such that all noise terms cancel, and the sum remain the same as the sum of
the original data. Our new insight is that in the shuffled model the addition of zero-sum noise can
be done without coordination between the users. Instead, each user individually produces numbers
y1, . . . , ym that are are fully random except that they sum to xi, and pass them to the shuffler. This is
visualized in Figure 2. Conceptually the noise we introduce acts as an invisibility cloak: The data is
still there, possible to aggregate, but is almost impossible to gain any other information from.
The details of our encoder is given as Algorithm 1. For parameters N , k, and m to be specified
later it converts each input xi to a set of random values {y1, . . . , ym} whose sum, up to scaling and
rounding, equals xi. When the output of all encoders EN,k,m(xi) is composed with a shuffler this
directly gives differential privacy with respect to sum-preserving changes of data (where the sum is
considered after rounding). To achieve differential privacy with respect to single-user changes the
protocol must be combined with a pre-randomizer that adds noise to each xi with some probability,
see discussion in Section 2.4.
Our analyzer is given as Algorithm 2. It computes z¯ as the sum of the inputs (received from the
shuffler) modulo N , which by definition of the encoder is guaranteed to equal the sum
∑
ibxikc of
scaled, rounded inputs. If x1, . . . , xn ∈ [0, 1] this sum will be in [0, nk] and z¯/k will be within n/k
of the true sum
∑
i xi. In the setting where a pre-randomizer adds noise to some inputs, however, we
may have z 6∈ [0, nk] in which case we round to the nearest feasible output sum, 0 or n.
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Figure 2: Diagram of the Invisibility Cloak Protocol for secure multi-party aggregation
Privacy Intuition. The output of each encoder is very close to fully random in the sense that every
set of m− 1 values are independent and uniformly random. Only by summing exactly the outputs
of an encoder (or several encoders) do we get a value that is not uniformly random. On the other
hand, many size-m subsets look like the output of an encoder in the sense that the sum of elements
corresponds to a feasible value xi. In fact, something stronger is true: For every possible input with
the same sum as the true input (sum taken after scaling and rounding) we can, with high probability,
find a splitting of the shuffler’s output consistent with that input. Furthermore, the number of such
splittings is about the same for each potential input.
Our technique can be compared to the recently proposed “privacy blanket” [2], which introduces
uniform, random noise to replace some inputs. Since that paper operates in a single-message model
there is no possibility of ensuring perfect noise cancellation, and thus the number of noise terms needs
to be kept small, which in turn means that a rather coarse discretization is required for differential
privacy. Since the noise we add is zero-sum we can add much more noise, and thus we do not need a
coarse discretization, ultimately resulting in much higher accuracy.
2 Analysis
Overview. We first consider privacy with respect to sum-preserving changes to the input, arguing
that observing the output of the shuffler gives almost no information on the input, apart from the sum.
Our proof strategy is to show privacy in the setting of two players and then argue that this implies
privacy for n players, essentially because the two-player privacy holds regardless of the behavior
of the other players. In the two-player case we first argue that with high probability the outputs of
the encoders satisfy a smoothness condition saying that every potential input x1, x2 to the encoders
corresponds to roughly the same number of divisions of the 2m shuffler outputs into sets of size m.
Finally we argue that smoothness in conjunction with the 2m elements being unique implies privacy.
Algorithm 1: Invisibility Cloak Encoder Algorithm
EN,k,m(x):
Input: x ∈ R, integer parameters N, k,m ≥ 4
Output: Multiset {y1, . . . , ym} ⊆ {0, . . . , N − 1}
Let x¯← bxkc
for j = 1, . . . ,m− 1 do
yj ← Uniform({0, . . . , N − 1})
ym ←
(
x¯−∑m−1j=1 yj) mod N
return {y1, . . . , ym}
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Algorithm 2: Analyzer
AN,k,n(y1, . . . , ymn):
Input: (y1, . . . , ynm) ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}mn, integer parameters k, n, odd N > 3nk
Output: z ∈ [0, n]
z¯ ←∑i yi mod N
if z¯ > 2nk then return 0;
else if z¯ > nk then return n;
else return z¯/k;
2.1 Preliminaries
Notation. We use Uniform(R) to denote a value uniformly sampled from a finite setR, and denote
by St the set of all permutations of {0, . . . , t− 1}. Unless stated otherwise, sets in this paper will
be multisets. It will be convenient to work with indexed multisets whose elements are identified by
indices in some set I . We can represent a multiset M ⊆ R with index set I as a function M : I → R.
Multisets M1 and M2 with index sets I1 and I2 are considered identical if there exists a bijection
pi : I1 → I2 such that M1(i) = M2(pi(i)) for all i ∈ I1. For disjoint I1 and I2 we define the union
of M1 and M2 as the function defined on I1 ∪ I2 that maps i1 ∈ I1 to M1(i1) and i2 ∈ I2 to M2(i2).
Differential Privacy and the Shuffled Model. We consider the established notion of differential
privacy, formalizing that the output distribution does not differ much between a certain data set and
any “neighboring” dataset.
Definition 1. Let A be a randomized algorithm taking as input a dataset and let ε ≥ 0 and
δ ∈ (0, 1) be given parameters. Then,A is said to be (ε, δ)-differentially private if for all neighboring
datasets D1 and D2 and for all subsets S of the image of A, it is the case that Pr[A(D1) ∈ S] ≤
eε · Pr[A(D2) ∈ S] + δ, where the probability is over the randomness used by the algorithm A.
We consider two notions of “neighboring dataset”: 1) That the input of a single user is changed, but all
other inputs are the same, and 2) That the sum of user inputs is preserved. In the latter case we consider
the sum after rounding to the nearest lower multiple of 1/k, for a large integer parameter k, i.e.,
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ [0, 1]n is a neighbor of (x′1, . . . , x′n) ∈ [0, 1]n if and only if
∑
ibxikc =
∑
ibx′ikc.
(Alternatively, just assume that the input is discretized such that xik is integer.)
In the shuffled model, the algorithm that we want to show differentially private is the composition of
the shuffler and the encoder algorithm run on user inputs. In contrast to the local model of differential
privacy, the outputs of encoders do not need to be differentially private. We refer to [5] for details.
2.2 Common lemmas
Let Y = {0, . . . , N − 1}, and consider some indexed multiset E = {y1, . . . , y2m} ⊆ Y that can
possibly be obtained as the union of the outputs of two encoders. Further, let I denote the collection
of subsets of {1, . . . , 2m} of size m. For each I ∈ I define XI(E) =
∑
i∈I yi mod N . We will be
interested in the following property of a given (fixed) multiset E:
Definition 2. A multiset E = {y1, . . . , y2m} is γ-smooth if the distribution of values XI(E) for
I ∈ I is close to uniform in the sense that Pri∈I [XI(E) = x] ∈
[
1−γ
N ,
1+γ
N
]
for every x ∈ Y .
We name the collection of multisets that are γ-smooth and contain 2m distinct elements:( Y
2m
)
γ-smooth
= {{y1, . . . , y2m} | {y1, . . . , y2m} is γ-smooth and y1, . . . , y2m are distinct} .
Given x1, x2 ∈ [0, 1] such that x1k and x2k are integers, consider the multisets EN,k,m(x1) =
{y1, . . . , ym} and EN,k,m(x2) = {ym+1, . . . , y2m}, and let E(x1, x2) = {y1, . . . , y2m} be their
multiset union. The multiset E(x1, x2) is a random variable due to the random choices made by the
encoder algorithm.
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Lemma 1. For every m ≥ 4, γ > 6√m/22m and for every choice of x1, x2 ∈ Y we have
Pr
[
E(x1, x2) 6∈
( Y
2m
)
γ-smooth
]
< 2m
2
N +
18
√
mN2
γ222m .
Proof of Lemma 1. We first upper bound the probability that the multisetE(x1, x2) has any duplicate
elements. For i 6= j consider the event Ei,j that yi = yj . Since m > 2 we have that every pair of
distinct values yi, yj are uniform in Y and independent, so Pr(Ei,j) = 1/N . A union bound over
all
(
2m
2
)
< 2m2 pairs yields an upper bound of 2m2/N on the probability that there is at least one
duplicate pair.
Second, we bound the probability that E(x1, x2) is not γ-smooth. Let I1 = {1, . . . ,m} and I2 =
{m+ 1, . . . , 2m}. Then by definition of the encoder, XI1(E(x1, x2)) = x1 and XI2(E(x1, x2)) =
x2 with probability 1. For each I ∈ I\{I1, I2} we have that XI is uniformly random in the
range Y , over the randomness of the encoder. Furthermore, observe that the random variables
{XI(E(x1, x2))}I∈I are pairwise independent. Let ZI(x) be the indicator random variable that is
1 if and only if XI(E(x1, x2)) = x. Let I ′ = I\{I1, I2}. For each x ∈ Y and I ∈ I ′ we have
E[ZI(x)] = 1/|Y| = 1/N . The sum Z(x) =
∑
I∈I ZI(x) equals the number of sets in I such that
XI(E(x1, x2)) = x. Since ZI1(x) = 1x1=x and ZI2(x) = 1x2=x it will be helpful to disregard
these fixed terms in Z(x). Thus we define Z ′(x) =
∑
I∈I′ ZI(x), which is a sum of |I|− 2 pairwise
independent terms, each with expectation E[ZI(x)] = 1/N . Define µ = E[Z ′(x)] = |I ′|/N . We
bound the variance of Z ′(x):
Var(Z ′(x)) = E
(∑
I∈I′
(ZI(x)− 1N )
)2 = E[∑
I∈I′
(
ZI(x)− 1N
)2]
< E
[∑
I∈I′
ZI(x)
]
= µ .
The second equality uses that E[(ZI1(x)− 1N )(ZI2(x)− 1N )] = 0 for I1 6= I2 because it is a product
of two independent, zero-mean random variables. The inequality holds because ZI(x) is an indicator
function. By Chebychev’s inequality over the random choices in the encoder, for any σ > 0:
Pr [|Z ′(x)− µ| > σµ] < Var(Z
′(x))
(σµ)2
<
1
σ2µ
. (1)
For m ≥ 4 we can bound |I| − 2 = (2mm )− 2 as follows:
22m−1/
√
m <
(
2m
m
)
− 2 < 22m/√m
Using this for upper and lower bounding µ in (1), and choosing σ = γ/3 we get:
Pr
[|Z ′(x)− µ| > γ 22m/(3N√m)] < 18√mN
µ22m
.
A union bound over all x ∈ Y implies that with probability at least 1− 18
√
mN2
γ222m :
∀x ∈ Y : |Z ′(x)− µ| ≤ γ 22m/(3N√m) (2)
Conditioned on (2) we have:
Pr
i∈I
[XI(E(x1, x2)) = x] = Z(x)/|I| ≤ (Z ′(x) + 2)/|I|
≤ µ+ 2 + γ 2
2m/(2N
√
m)
|I|
≤ 1
N
+
2 + γ 22m/(3N
√
m)
22m−1/
√
m
=
1 +
√
m
22m−1 + 2γ/3
N
≤ 1 + γ
N
.
The final inequality uses the assumption that γ > 6
√
m/22m. A similar computation shows that
conditioned on (2), Pri∈I [XI(E(x1, x2)) = x] ≥ 1−γN .
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Corollary 1. For m ≥ 4, and m = 3dlogNe,
Pr
[
E(x1, x2) 6∈
( Y
2m
)
N−1-smooth
]
<
19dlogNe2
N
.
Proof. We invoke Lemma 1 with γ = N−1 and m = 3dlogNe. The probability bound is
18dlogNe2
N
+
18
√
3dlogNeN2
N−2 26dlogNe
<
18dlogNe2
N
+
18dlogNe
N2
.
Because logN ≥ 3 and N ≥ 6 this shows the stated bound.
Denote by E(x1, x2; y1, . . . , ym−1, ym+1, . . . , y2m−1) the sequence obtained by the deterministic
encoding for given values y1, . . . , ym−1, ym+1, . . . , y2m−1 ∈ Y in Algorithm 1. Moreover, we
denote by E(x1, x2, y1, . . . , ym−1, ym+1, . . . , y2m−1) the corresponding multiset.
Lemma 2. For any y∗ ∈ ( Y2m) and for any x1 and x2, it is the case that
Pr[E(x1, x2) = y
∗] =
1
|Y|2(m−1) ·
∑
pi∈S2m
1E(x1,x2;pi(y∗)1,...,pi(y∗)m−1,pi(y∗)m+1,...,pi(y∗)2m−1)=pi(y∗).
Proof of Lemma 2. Using the fact that all the elements in y∗ are distinct, we have that
Pr[E(x1, x2) = y
∗] =
∑
y1,...,ym−1,
ym+1,...,y2m−1∈Y
1
|Y|2(m−1) · 1E(x1,x2;y1,...,ym−1,ym+1,...,y2m−1)=y∗
=
1
|Y|2(m−1) ·
∑
distinct y1,...,ym−1
ym+1,...,y2m−1∈Y
1E(x1,x2;y1,...,ym−1,ym+1,...,y2m−1)=y∗
=
1
|Y|2(m−1) ·
∑
distinct y1,...,ym−1
ym+1,...,y2m−1∈Y
∑
pi∈S2m
1E(x1,x2;y1,...,ym−1,ym+1,...,y2m−1)=pi(y∗)
=
1
|Y|2(m−1) ·
∑
pi∈S2m
∑
distinct y1,...,ym−1
ym+1,...,y2m−1∈Y
1E(x1,x2;y1,...,ym−1,ym+1,...,y2m−1)=pi(y∗)
=
1
|Y|2(m−1) ·
∑
pi∈S2m
1E(x1,x2;pi(y∗)1,...,pi(y∗)m−1,pi(y∗)m+1,...,pi(y∗)2m−1)=pi(y∗)
2.3 Analysis of Privacy under Sum-Preserving Changes
Lemma 3. For any y∗ ∈ ( Y2m)γ-smooth and for all x1, x2, x′1, x′2 that are integer multiples of 1/k and
that satisfy x1 + x2 = x′1 + x
′
2, it is the case that Pr[E(x1, x2) = y
∗] ≤ 1+γ1−γ · Pr[E(x′1, x′2) = y∗].
Proof of Lemma 3. We denote by
∑
i y
∗
i :=
∑
i∈[2m] y
∗
i the sum of all elements in the set y
∗. We
define
By∗,x1 := Number of subsets S of {1, . . . , 2m} of size m for which
∑
i∈S
y∗i = x1k mod N. (3)
We similarly define By∗,x′1 by replacing x1 in (3) by x
′
1.
Since y∗ ∈ ( Y2m), Lemma 2 implies that
Pr[E(x1, x2) = y
∗] =
1
|Y|2(m−1) ·
∑
pi∈S2m
1E(x1,x2;pi(y∗)1,...,pi(y∗)m−1,pi(y∗)m+1,...,pi(y∗)2m−1)=pi(y∗)
=
(m!)2
|Y|2(m−1) ·By∗,x1 · 1
∑
i y
∗
i =x1k+x2k
. (4)
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Similarly, we have that
Pr[E(x′1, x
′
2) = y
∗] =
(m!)2
|Y|2(m−1) ·By∗,x′1 · 1
∑
i y
∗
i =x
′
1k+x
′
2k
. (5)
Since y∗ is γ-smooth, Definition 2 implies that
By∗,x1
By∗,x′1
≤ 1 + γ
1− γ . (6)
By Equations (4) and (5) and the assumption that x1 + x2 = x′1 + x
′
2 (as well as the assumption that
x1, x2, x
′
1, x
′
2 are all integer multiples of 1/k), we get that for every γ-smooth y
∗ whose sum is not
equal to x1k + x2k, it is the case that
Pr[E(x1, x2) = y
∗] = Pr[E(x′1, x
′
2) = y
∗] = 0, (7)
and for every γ-smooth y∗ whose sum is equal to x1k+ x2k, the ratio of Equations (4) and (5) along
with (6) give that
Pr[E(x1, x2) = y
∗] ≤ 1 + γ
1− γ · Pr[E(x
′
1, x
′
2) = y
∗]. (8)
Lemma 4. Suppose x1, x2, . . . , xn ∈ R and x′1, x′2, . . . , x′n ∈ R that are integer multiples of 1/k
satisfying xi = x′i for all i 6= j1, j2, where 1 ≤ j1 6= j2 ≤ n. Moreover, suppose that for any set T
consisting of multisets of 2m elements from Y , we have the following guarantee:
Pr[E(xj1 , xj2) ∈ T ] ≤ eε · Pr[E(x′j1 , x′j2) ∈ T ] + δ (9)
for some ε, δ > 0. Then, it follows that for any set S of multisets consisting of mn elements from Y ,
Pr[E(x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ S] ≤ eε · Pr[E(x′1, x′2, . . . , x′n) ∈ S] + δ.
Proof of Lemma 4. Without loss of generality, assume j1 = 1 and j2 = 2 (by symmetry). Thus,
xi = x
′
i for i = 3, . . . , n. For ease of notation, let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and x
′ = (x′1, x
′
2, . . . , x
′
n).
Suppose S is an arbitrary set of multisets of mn elements from Y . For any A ⊂ Ym, we let RS,A
denote
RS,A =
⋃
T∈S
(
T \
⋃
a∈A
{a1, a2, . . . , am}
)
.
Then, we observe that
Pr[E(x) ∈ S] =
∑
y3,...,yn∈Ym
Pr[E(x) ∈ S | ∀i > 2, E(xi) = yi] ·
n∏
j=3
Pr[E(xj) = yj ]
=
∑
y3,...,yn
Pr
[
E(x1, x2) ∈ RS,{y3,y4,...,yn}
] · n∏
j=3
Pr[E(xj) = yj ]
=
∑
y3,...,yn
(
eε · Pr [E(x′1, x′2) ∈ RS,{y3,y4,...,yn}]+ δ) · n∏
j=3
Pr[E(x′j) = yj ] (10)
≤ eε · Pr [E(x′) ∈ S] + δ ·
∑
y3,...,yn∈Y
 n∏
j=3
Pr[E(x′j) = yj ]

≤ eε · Pr [E(x′) ∈ S] + δ,
where (10) follows from (9) and the fact that xi = x′i for i = 3, 4, . . . , n. This completes the
proof.
Lemma 5. Suppose x1, x2, . . . , xn ∈ R and x′1, x′2, . . . , x′n ∈ R such that xj1 + xj2 = x′j1 + x′j2
(each of these being an integer multiple of 1/k) and xi = x′i for all i 6= j1, j2, where 1 ≤ j1 6= j2 ≤ n.
Then, for any set S of multisets consisting of mn elements from Y , we have Pr[E(x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈
S] ≤ 1+γ1−γ · Pr[E(x′1, x′2, . . . , x′n) ∈ S] + η, where η = 2m
2
N +
18
√
mN2
γ222m and γ >
6
√
m
22m .
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Proof of Lemma 5. Without loss of generality, let j1 = 1 and j2 = 2. We now consider any set T of
multisets of 2m elements from Y . Observe that
Pr[E(x1, x2) ∈ T ] ≤ Pr
[
E(x1, x2) 6∈
( Y
2m
)
γ-smooth
]
+ Pr
[
E(x1, x2) ∈ T ∩
( Y
2m
)
γ-smooth
]
≤ η +
∑
A∈T∩( Y2m)γ-smooth
Pr[E(x1, x2) = A] (11)
≤ η +
∑
A∈T∩( Y2m)γ-smooth
1 + γ
1− γ · Pr[E(x
′
1, x
′
2) = A] (12)
≤ η + 1 + γ
1− γ · Pr[E(x
′
1, x
′
2) ∈ T ],
where (11) and (12) follow from Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, respectively. The desired result now follows
from a direct application of Lemma 4.
Using Lemma 5 as a building block for analyzing differential privacy guarantees in the context of sum-
preserving swaps, we can derive a differential privacy result with respect to general sum-preserving
changes.
Lemma 6. Suppose x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and x′ = (x′1, x′2, . . . , x′n) have coordinates that are
integer multiples of 1/k satisfying x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xn = x′1 + x′2 + · · ·+ x′n and x′ can be obtained
from x by a series of t sum-preserving swaps. Then, for any S, we have Pr[E(x′1, x
′
2, . . . , x
′
n) ∈ S] ≤
βt Pr[E(x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ S] + η · β
t−1
β−1 , where η =
2m2
N +
18
√
mN2
γ222m , γ >
6
√
m
22m , and β =
1+γ
1−γ .
Proof of Lemma 6. We prove the lemma by induction on t. Note that the case t = 1 holds by
Lemma 5.
Now, for the inductive step, suppose the lemma holds for t = r. We wish to show that it also holds
for t = r + 1. Note that there exists some x′′ ∈ Yn such that (1) x′′ can be obtained from x by a
series of r sum-preserving swaps and (2) x′ can be obtained from x′′ by a single sum-preserving
swap. By the inductive hypothesis, we have that
Pr[E(x′′1 , x
′′
2 , . . . , x
′′
n) ∈ S] ≤ βr Pr[E(x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ S] + η ·
βr − 1
β − 1 . (13)
Moreover, by Lemma 4, we have that
Pr[E(x′1, x
′
2, . . . , x
′
n) ∈ S] ≤ β Pr[E(x′′1 , x′′2 , . . . , x′′n) ∈ S] + η. (14)
Combining (13) and (14), we note that
Pr[E(x′1, x
′
2, . . . , x
′
n) ∈ S] ≤ β
(
βr Pr[E(x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ S] + η · β
r − 1
β − 1
)
+ η
≤ βr+1 Pr[E(x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ S] + η · β
r+1 − 1
β − 1 ,
which establishes the claim for t = r + 1.
As a consequence, we obtain the following main theorem establishing differential privacy of Algo-
rithm 1 with respect to sum-preserving changes in the shuffled model:
Theorem 2. Let ε > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1) be any real numbers and let m > 10 log ( nεδ ). There exists a
protocol in the shuffled model that is (ε, δ)-differentially private under sum-preserving changes, has
worst-case error 2−m, and where each encoder sends m messages of O(m) bits.
Proof of Theorem 2. In Algorithm 1, each user communicates at most O(m logN) bits which are
sent via m messages. Note that if x = (x1, . . . , xn) and x′ = (x′1, . . . , x
′
n) have coordinates that
are integer multiples of 1/k satisfying x1 + · · ·+ xn = x′1 + · · ·+ x′n, then there is a sequence of
t ≤ n− 1 sum-preserving swaps that allows us to transform x into x′. Thus, Lemma 6 implies that
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Algorithm 1 is (ε, δ)-differentially private with respect to sum-preserving changes if (1+γ)
n−1
(1−γ)n−1 ≤ eε,
and 2m
2
N +
18
√
mN2
γ222m ≤ δ, for any γ > 6
√
m
22m and m ≥ 4. The error in our final estimate (which is due
to rounding) is O(n/k) in the worst case. The theorem now follows by choosing m > 10 log
(
nk
εδ
)
,
γ = ε10n , k = 10n and N being the first odd integer larger than 3kn+
10
δ +
10
ε .
2.4 Analysis of Privacy under Single-User Changes
The main idea is to run Algorithm 1 after having each player add some noise to her input, with some
fixed probability independently from the other players. We need the noise distribution to satisfy
three properties: it should be supported on a finite interval, the logarithm of its probability mass
function should have a small Lipschitz-constant (even under modular arithmetic) and its variance
should be small. The following truncated version of the discrete Laplace distribution satisfies all
three properties.
Definition 3 (Truncated Discrete Laplace Distribution). Let N be a positive odd integer and p ∈
(0, 1). The probability mass function of the truncated discrete Laplace distribution DN,p is defined
by
DN,p[k] = (1− p) · p
|k|
1 + p− 2pN+12
(15)
for every integer k in the range {− (N−1)2 , . . . ,+ (N−1)2 }.
Lemma 7 (Log-Lipschitzness). Let N be a positive odd integer and p ∈ (0, 1) a real number. Define
the interval I = {− (N−1)2 , . . . ,+ (N−1)2 }. For all k ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} and all t ∈ I , it is the case
that p|t| ≤ DN,p[(k+t) mod I]DN,p[k mod I] ≤ p−|t|.
Proof of Lemma 7. We start by noting that (15) implies that
DN,p[(k + t) mod I]
DN,p[k mod I] =
p|(k+t) mod I|
p|k mod I|
. (16)
We distinguish six cases depending on the values of k and k + t:
Case 1 : 0 ≤ k ≤ N − 1
2
and − (N − 1)
2
≤ k + t ≤ −1. (17)
Case 2 : 0 ≤ k ≤ N − 1
2
and 0 ≤ k + t ≤ N − 1
2
. (18)
Case 3 : 0 ≤ k ≤ N − 1
2
and
N + 1
2
≤ k + t ≤ N − 1. (19)
Case 4 :
N + 1
2
≤ k ≤ N − 1 and 1 ≤ k + t ≤ N − 1
2
. (20)
Case 5 :
N + 1
2
≤ k ≤ N − 1 and N + 1
2
≤ k + t ≤ N − 1. (21)
Case 6 :
N + 1
2
≤ k ≤ N − 1 and N ≤ k + t ≤ N − 1 + N − 1
2
. (22)
In Cases 1, 2 and 3, we have that 0 ≤ k ≤ N−12 which implies that |k mod I| = k and hence the
denominator in (16) satisfies
p|k mod I| = pk. (23)
Plugging (23) in (16), we get
DN,p[(k + t) mod I]
DN,p[k mod I] =
p|(k+t) mod I|
pk
. (24)
We now separately examine each of these three cases.
10
Case 1. If (17) holds, then |(k + t) mod I| = −k − t and the numerator in (24) becomes
p|(k+t) mod I| = p−k−t. (25)
Plugging (25) in (24), we get
DN,p[(k + t) mod I]
DN,p[k mod I] = p
−2k−t. (26)
Using the facts that k + t < 0 and k ≥ 0, and thus that t < 0, we get that the quantity in (26) is at
most p−|t| and at least p|t|.
Case 2. If (18) holds, then |(k + t) mod I| = k + t and the numerator in (24) becomes
p|(k+t) mod I| = pk+t. (27)
Plugging (27) in (24), we get
DN,p[(k + t) mod I]
DN,p[k mod I] = p
t.
Case 3. If (19) holds, then |(k + t) mod I| = N − k − t and the numerator in (24) becomes
p|(k+t) mod I| = pN−k−t. (28)
Plugging (28) in (24), we get
DN,p[(k + t) mod I]
DN,p[k mod I] = p
N−2k−t. (29)
Using the fact that k + t ≥ N+12 which, along with the fact that k ≤ N−12 , implies that t > 0, we get
that the quantity in (29) is at most p−|t| and at least p|t|.
We now turn to Cases 4, 5 and 6. In these, N+12 ≤ k ≤ N−1, which implies that |k mod I| = N−k
and hence the denominator in (16) satisfies
p|k mod I| = pN−k. (30)
Plugging (30) in (16), we get
DN,p[(k + t) mod I]
DN,p[k mod I] =
p|(k+t) mod I|
pN−k
. (31)
We now separately examine each of these three cases.
Case 4. If (20) holds, then |(k + t) mod I| = k + t and the numerator in (31) becomes
p|(k+t) mod I| = pk+t. (32)
Plugging (32) in (31), we get
DN,p[(k + t) mod I]
DN,p[k mod I] = p
2k+t−N . (33)
Using the facts that k+ t ≤ N−12 and k ≥ N+12 , we deduce that t < 0 and that the quantity in (33) is
at most p−|t| and at least p|t|.
Case 5. If (21) holds, then |(k + t) mod I| = N − k − t and the numerator in (31) becomes
p|(k+t) mod I| = pN−k−t. (34)
Plugging (34) in (31), we get
DN,p[(k + t) mod I]
DN,p[k mod I] = p
−t.
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Case 6. If (22) holds, then |(k + t) mod I| = k + t−N and the numerator in (31) becomes
p|(k+t) mod I| = pk+t−N . (35)
Plugging (35) in (31), we get
DN,p[(k + t) mod I]
DN,p[k mod I] = p
2k+t−2N . (36)
Using the facts that k < N and k + t ≥ N , we get that t > 0 and that the quantity in (36) is at most
p−|t| and at least p|t|.
Lemma 8. LetN be a positive odd integer and p ∈ (0, 1) a real number. LetX be a random variable
drawn from the truncated discrete Laplace distribution DN,p. Then, the mean and variance of X
satisfy E[X] = 0 and Var[X] ≤ 2p(1+p)
(1−p)2(1+p−2p(N+1)/2) .
In order to prove Lemma 8, we will need the simple fact given in Lemma 9.
Lemma 9. For any p ∈ [0, 1), it is the case that
∞∑
k=1
k2pk =
p(1 + p)
(1− p)3 .
Proof of Lemma 9. For every p ∈ [0, 1), we consider the geometric series f(p) :=
∞∑
k=1
pk. Differen-
tiating and multiplying by p, we get pf ′(p) =
∞∑
k=1
kpk. Differentiating a second time and multiplying
by p, we get
p(pf ′(p))′ =
∞∑
k=1
k2pk. (37)
Using the formula for a convergent geometric series, we have f(p) = p1−p . Plugging this expression
in (37) and differentiating, we get
∞∑
k=1
k2pk =
p(1 + p)
(1− p)3 .
Proof of Lemma 8. We have that
E[X] =
(N−1)/2∑
k=−(N−1)/2
k · DN,p[k] =
(N−1)/2∑
k=1
k · (DN,p[k]−DN,p[−k]) = 0, (38)
where the last equality follows from the fact thatDN,p[k] = DN,p[−k] for all k ∈ {1, . . . , (N−1)/2}
(which directly follows from (15)). Using this same property along with (38), we also get that
Var[X] = E[X2] =
(N−1)/2∑
k=−(N−1)/2
k2 · DN,p[k] = 2 ·
(N−1)/2∑
k=1
k2 · DN,p[k] (39)
Plugging the definition (15) of DN,p[k] in (39), we get
Var[X] =
2(1− p)
(1 + p)(1 + p− 2p(N+1)/2)
(N−1)/2∑
k=1
k2pk
≤ 2(1− p)
(1 + p)(1 + p− 2p(N+1)/2)
∞∑
k=1
k2pk. (40)
Applying Lemma 9 in (40) and simplifying, we get that Var[X] ≤ 2p(1+p)
(1−p)2(1+p−2p(N+1)/2) .
The next lemma will be used to show that our algorithm is differentially private with respect to
single-user changes.
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Lemma 10. Let w1, w2 be two independent random variable sampled from the truncated discrete
Laplace distribution DN,p where N is any positive odd integer and p ∈ (0, 1) is any real number,
and let z1 = w1k and z2 =
w2
k . For any y
∗ ∈ ( Y2m)γ-smooth and for all x1, x2, x′1 ∈ [0, 1), if we denote
x˜1 =
bx1kc
k , x˜2 =
bx2kc
k and x˜
′
1 =
bx′1kc
k , then
Pr[E(x˜1, x˜2 + z2) = y
∗] ≤ 1 + γ
1− γ · p
−k · Pr[E(x˜′1, x˜2 + z2) = y∗], (41)
Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, x˜2) = y
∗] ≤ 1 + γ
1− γ · p
−k · Pr[E(x˜′1 + z1, x˜2) = y∗]. (42)
and
Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, x˜2 + z2) = y
∗] ≤ 1 + γ
1− γ · p
−k · Pr[E(x˜′1 + z1, x˜2 + z2) = y∗]. (43)
Proof of Lemma 10. As in Lemma 7, we define the interval I = {− (N−1)2 , . . . ,+ (N−1)2 }. We define
By∗,x1 := Number of subsets S of {1, . . . , 2m} of size m for which
∑
i∈S
y∗i = bx1kc mod N.
(44)
We similarly define By∗,x′1 and By∗,x2 by replacing x1 in (44) by x
′
1 and x2 respectively.
Proof of Inequality (41). By Lemma 2, we have that
Pr[E(x˜1, x˜2 + z2) = y
∗]
=
1
|Y|2(m−1) ·
∑
pi∈S2m
1E(x˜1,x˜2+z2;pi(y∗)1,...,pi(y∗)m−1,pi(y∗)m+1,...,pi(y∗)2m−1)=pi(y∗)
=
(m!)2
|Y|2(m−1) ·By∗,x1 · Prz2∼DN,p[z2 = (
∑
i∈[2m]
y∗i − bx1kc − bx2kc) mod N ] (45)
=
(m!)2
|Y|2(m−1) ·By∗,x1 · DN,p[(
∑
i∈[2m]
y∗i − bx1kc − bx2kc) mod I]. (46)
By Lemma 2, we also have that
Pr[E(x˜′1, x˜2 + z2) = y
∗]
=
1
|Y|2(m−1) ·
∑
pi∈S2m
1E(x˜′1,x˜2+z2;pi(y∗)1,...,pi(y∗)m−1,pi(y∗)m+1,...,pi(y∗)2m−1)=pi(y∗)
=
(m!)2
|Y|2(m−1) ·By∗,x′1 · Prz2∼DN,p[z2 = (
∑
i∈[2m]
y∗i − bx′1kc − bx2kc) mod N ]
=
(m!)2
|Y|2(m−1) ·By∗,x′1 · DN,p[(
∑
i∈[2m]
y∗i − bx′1kc − bx2kc) mod I]. (47)
Since y∗ is γ-smooth, Definition 2 implies that
By∗,x1
By∗,x′1
≤ 1 + γ
1− γ . (48)
Applying Lemma 7 with k =
∑
i∈[2m] y
∗
i − bx′1kc − bx2kc and t = bx′1kc − bx1kc and using the
fact that x1, x′1 ∈ [0, 1) gives
DN,p[(
∑
i∈[2m] y
∗
i − bx1kc − bx2kc) mod I]
DN,p[(
∑
i∈[2m] y
∗
i − bx′1kc − bx2kc) mod I]
≤ p−|bx′1kc−bx1kc| ≤ p−k. (49)
Dividing (46) by (47) and using (48) and (49), we get Inequality (41).
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Proof of Inequality (42). We note that similarly to (47) we have
Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, x˜2) = y
∗] =
(m!)2
|Y|2(m−1) · |Bx2 | · DN,p[(
∑
i∈[2m]
y∗i − bx1kc − bx2kc) mod I], (50)
and
Pr[E(x˜′1 + z1, x˜2) = y
∗] =
(m!)2
|Y|2(m−1) · |Bx2 | · DN,p[(
∑
i∈[2m]
y∗i − bx′1kc − bx2kc) mod I], (51)
Dividing (50) by (51) and using (49), we get Inequality (42).
Proof of Inequality (43). By averaging over z2 and applying Inequality (42) with x˜2 replaced by
x˜2 + z2 (for every fixed setting of z2), we get Inequality (43).
Lemma 11. Let N be a positive odd integer and p ∈ (0, 1) and q ∈ (0, 1] be real numbers. Let
b1, . . . , bn be iid random variables that are equal to 1 with probability q and to 0 otherwise, let
w1, . . . , wn be iid random variables that are drawn from the truncated discrete Laplace distribution
DN,p independently of b1, . . . , bn, and let zi = biwik for all i ∈ [n]. Then, for all j ∈ [n], all
x1, . . . , xj , . . . , xn, x
′
j ∈ [0, 1), if we denote x˜i = bxikck for all i ∈ [n] and x˜′j =
bx′jkc
k , then for all
S, the following inequality holds
Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, . . . , x˜j + zj , . . . , x˜n + zn) ∈ S]
≤ 1 + γ
1− γ ·
p−k
1− e−qn · Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, . . . , x˜
′
j + zj , . . . , x˜n + zn) ∈ S] + η + e−qn, (52)
for any γ > 6
√
m
22m , m ≥ 4 and η = 2m
2
N +
18
√
mN2
γ222m , and where the probabilities in (52) are over
z1, . . . , zn and the internal randomness of E(·).
Proof of Lemma 11. Let A denote the event that there exists at least one i ∈ [n] for which bi = 1.
Then,
Pr[A] = 1− (1− q)n ≥ 1− e−qn, (53)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that et ≥ 1 + t for any real number t. To prove (52), it
suffices to show a similar inequality conditioned on the event A, i.e.,
Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, . . . , x˜j + zj , . . . , x˜n + zn) ∈ S | A]
≤ 1 + γ
1− γ · p
−k · Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, . . . , x˜′j + zj , . . . , x˜n + zn) ∈ S | A] + η. (54)
To see this, denote by A the complement of the event A and assume that (54) holds. Then,
Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, . . . , x˜j + zj , . . . , x˜n + zn) ∈ S]
= Pr[A] · Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, . . . , x˜j + zj , . . . , x˜n + zn) ∈ S | A]
+ Pr[A] · Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, . . . , x˜j + zj , . . . , x˜n + zn) ∈ S | A]
≤ Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, . . . , x˜j + zj , . . . , x˜n + zn) ∈ S | A] + e−qn (55)
≤ 1 + γ
1− γ · p
−k · Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, . . . , x˜′j + zj , . . . , x˜n + zn) ∈ S | A] + η + e−qn (56)
≤ 1 + γ
1− γ · p
−k · Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, . . . , x˜
′
j + zj , . . . , x˜n + zn) ∈ S]
Pr[A]
+ η + e−qn
≤ 1 + γ
1− γ ·
p−k
1− e−qn · Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, . . . , x˜
′
j + zj , . . . , x˜n + zn) ∈ S] + η + e−qn, (57)
where (55) and (57) follow from (53), and where (56) follows from the assumption that (54) holds.
We thus turn to the proof of (54). Note that it suffices to prove this inequality for any fixed setting of
b1, . . . , bn satisfying the event A, i.e.,
Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, . . . , x˜j + zj , . . . , x˜n + zn) ∈ S | b1, . . . , bn]
≤ 1 + γ
1− γ · p
−k · Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, . . . , x˜′j + zj , . . . , x˜n + zn) ∈ S | b1, . . . , bn] + η, (58)
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and (54) would follows from (58) by averaging. Henceforth, we fix a setting of b1, . . . , bn satisfying
the event A. Without loss of generality, we assume that j = 1. If bj = 0, then the event A implies
that there exists j2 6= j such that bj2 = 1. Without loss of generality, we assume that j2 = 2. In
order to show (58) for this setting of b1, . . . , bn, it suffices to show the same inequality where we also
condition on any setting of w3, . . . , wn, i.e.,
Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, . . . , x˜j + zj , . . . , x˜n + zn) ∈ S | b1, . . . , bn, w3, . . . , wn]
≤ 1 + γ
1− γ · p
−k · Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, . . . , x˜′j + zj , . . . , x˜n + zn) ∈ S | b1, . . . , bn, w3, . . . , wn] + η,
(59)
Applying Lemma 4 with j1 = j = 1 and j2 = 2 and with inputs x˜′3 + z3, . . . , x˜
′
n + zn for the
non-selected players, we get that to prove (59), it suffices to show that for any set T , the following
inequality holds
Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, x˜2 + z2) ∈ T ] ≤ 1 + γ
1− γ · p
−k · Pr[E(x˜′1 + z1, x˜2 + z2) ∈ T ] + η. (60)
We now prove (60):
Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, x˜2 + z2) ∈ T ]
≤ Pr
[
E(x˜1 + z1, x˜2 + z2) 6∈
( Y
2m
)
γ-smooth
]
+ Pr
[
E(x˜1 + z1, x˜2 + z2) ∈ T ∩
( Y
2m
)
γ-smooth
]
≤ η +
∑
A∈T∩( Y2m)γ-smooth
Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, x˜2 + z2) = A] (61)
≤ η +
∑
A∈T∩( Y2m)γ-smooth
1 + γ
1− γ · p
−k · Pr[E(x˜′1 + z1, x˜2 + z2) = A] (62)
≤ η + 1 + γ
1− γ · p
−k · Pr[E(x˜′1 + z1, x˜2 + z2) ∈ T ],
with η = 2m
2
N +
18
√
mN2
γ222m and where (61) follows by averaging over all settings of z1, z2 and invoking
Lemma 1, and (62) follows from Lemma 10 and the fact that at least one of b1, b2 is equal to 1.
As a consequence, we obtain the following main theorem establishing differential privacy of Algo-
rithm 1 with respect to single-user changes in the shuffled model:
Theorem 1. Let ε > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1) be any real numbers. There exists a protocol in the shuffled
model that is (ε, δ)-differentially private under single-user changes, has expected error O( 1ε
√
log 1δ ),
and where each encoder sends O(log( nεδ )) messages of O(log(
n
δ )) bits.
Proof of Theorem 1. In Algorithm 1, each user communicates at most O(m logN) bits which are
sent via m messages. By Lemma 11, Algorithm 1 is (ε, δ)-differentially private with respect to
single-user changes if 1+γ1−γ · p
−k
1−e−qn ≤ eε, and 2m
2
N +
18
√
mN2
γ222m + e
−qn ≤ δ, for any γ > 6
√
m
22m
and m ≥ 4. The error in our final estimate consists of two parts: the rounding error which is
O(n/k) in the worst case, and the error due to the added folded Discrete Laplace noise whose
average absolute value is at most O
(√
qn
1−p
)
(this follows from Lemma 8 along with the facts that the
variance is additive for independent random variables, and that for any zero-mean random variable
X , it is the case that E[|X|] ≤ √Var[X]). The theorem now follows by choosing p = 1 − ε10k ,
q = 10 log(1/δ)n , m = 10 log
(
nk
εδ
)
, γ = ε10 , k = 10n and N being the first odd integer larger than
3kn+ 10δ +
10
ε .
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2.5 Resilience Against Colluding Users
In this section, we formalize the resilience of Algorithm 1 against a very large fraction of the users
colluding with with the server (thereby revealing their inputs and messages).
Lemma 12 (Resilient privacy under sum-preserving changes). Let C ⊆ [n] denote the subset of
colluding users. Then, for all x1, . . . , . . . , xn and x′1, . . . , . . . , x
′
n that are integer multiples of 1/k
in the interval [0, 1) and that satisfy
∑
j /∈C xj =
∑
j /∈C x
′
j and x
′
j = xj for all j ∈ C, and for all
subsets S, the following inequality holds
Pr[E(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ S | E(xi) ∀i ∈ C]
≤ βn−1 · Pr[E(x′1, . . . , x′n) ∈ S | E(xi) ∀i ∈ C] +
(βn−1 − 1)
(β − 1) · η, (63)
for β = 1+γ1−γ , any γ >
6
√
m
22m , m ≥ 4 and η = 2m
2
N +
18
√
mN2
γ222m , and where the probabilities in (63)
are over the internal randomness of E(·).
Lemma 13 (Resilient privacy under single-user changes). Let N be a positive odd integer and
p ∈ (0, 1) and q ∈ (0, 1] be real numbers. Let C ⊆ [n] denote the subset of colluding users. Let
b1, . . . , bn be iid random variables that are equal to 1 with probability q and to 0 otherwise, let
w1, . . . , wn be iid random variables that are drawn from the folded discrete Laplace distribution
DN,p independently of b1, . . . , bn, and let zi = biwik for all i ∈ [n]. If |C| ≤ 0.9n, then for all j /∈ C,
all x1, . . . , xj , . . . , xn, x′j ∈ [0, 1) and all subsets S, if we denote x˜i = bxikck for all i ∈ [n] and
x˜′j =
bx′jkc
k , then
Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, . . . , x˜j + zj , . . . , x˜n + zn) ∈ S | E(x˜i + zi) ∀i ∈ C]
≤ 1 + γ
1− γ ·
p−k
1− e−q(n−|C|) · Pr[E(x˜1 + z1, . . . , x˜
′
j + zj , . . . , x˜n + zn) ∈ S | E(x˜i + zi) ∀i ∈ C]
+ η + e−q(n−|C|), (64)
for any γ > 6
√
m
22m , m ≥ 4 and η = 2m
2
N +
18
√
mN2
γ222m , and where the probabilities in (64) are over
z1, . . . , zn and the internal randomness of E(·).
Proof of Lemma 12. We start by applying Lemma 4 in order to condition on the messages of all
the colluding users. This allows us to reduce to the case where the messages of all users in C are
fixed and where we would like to prove the differential privacy guarantee with respect to single-user
changes on the inputs of the smaller subset [n] \ C of (non-colluding) users. The rest of the proof
follows along the same lines as the proof of Lemma 6 with any modification in the bounds.
Proof of Lemma 13. We start by applying Lemma 4 in order to condition on the messages of all
colluding users. This allows us to reduce to the case where the messages of all users in C are fixed
and where we would like to prove differential privacy guarantees with respect to sum-preserving
changes on the smaller subset [n]\C of (non-colluding) users. The rest of the proof follows along the
same lines as the proof of Lemma 11. Note that that the tail probability term e−qn in (52) is replaced
by the slightly larger quantity e−q(n−|C|) in (64) as the event A in the proof of Lemma 11 has now to
be defined over the smaller set [n] \ C of non-colluding users (and consequently the bounds in (53)
and (57) are modified similarly).
3 Conclusion and Open Problems
Our work provides further evidence that the shuffled model of differential privacy [3, 5] is a fertile
”middle ground” between local differential privacy and general multi-party computations, combining
the scalability of local DP with the high utility and privacy of MPC. This makes it more feasible to
design scalable machine learning systems in a federated setting.
The main open problem that we leave is how many messages m are necessary to achieve differential
privacy without a cost of nΩ(1) in error or communication. It is shown in [2] that m = 1 is not
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enough, but we cannot rule out that m = O(logn k) suffices to achieve error 1/k under sum-
preserving changes, using our protocol unchanged. Another issue is that our current protocol fails
to provide privacy with some small probability, for example if all random numbers chosen by the
encoder happen to be zero. The question is whether the error probability can be eliminated by
somehow changing the protocol, achieving pure differential privacy.
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